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COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
All parties in the proceeding in and before the Third District Court are listed 
in the caption of the case in this court. 
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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED BY THE APPEAL 
1. Did the district court misread the promissory note in this case as 
requiring the reconveyance of both parcels of property securing the note upon the 
payment of principal amount of the note, even though the note expressly conditioned 
reconveyance of one parcel upon payment of a separate obligation one of the defendants 
owed plaintiff? 
This issue was raised below and was the basis for motions for summary 
judgment. R. 23-64 and 70-104. The construction of a contract is a legal question. 
Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of fact exist and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
'"Because entitlement to summary judgment is a question of law, [this court] accord[s] no 
deference to the trial court's resolution of the legal issues presented/" Salt Lake County 
Cornm'n v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 985 P. 2d. 899, 902 (Utah \999)(quoting K & T 
Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P. 2d. 623, 627 (Utah 1994)). 
2. Did a genuine issue of material fact exist regarding whether defendant 
was required to pay off another obligation before receiving reconveyance of one parcel of 
property securing the promissory note in this case? 
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This issue was raised below in the motions for summary judgment and the 
accompanying affidavits. R. 120-128. Summary judgment is appropriate only when no 
genuine issues of fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). ""Because entitlement to summary judgment is a question 
of law, [this court] accord[s] no deference to the trial court's resolution of the legal issues 
presented."' Salt Lake County Comm'n v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 985 P. 2d. 899. 902 
(Utah l999)(quoting K & Tine. v. Koroulis, 888 P. 2d 623, 627 (Utah 1994)). 
3. Did the district court err when it denied plaintiffs post summary 
judgment motion to amend the complaint to allege a claim asking the Court to reform the 
deed of trust to conform to the parties' intentions? 
This issue was raised below by plaintiffs Motion to Amend. R. 181-191. 
This court reviews decisions of a district court denying a motion to amend for abuse of 
discretion. Aurora Credit Srvs.} Inc. v. Liberty West Dev., Inc., 97 P. 2d 1273, 1281 (Utah 
1988). Motions to amend generally are to be liberally granted. Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Appellant does not believe there are any determinative constitutional 
provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations. This case seeks proper construction 
of an agreement between the parties. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Proceedings and Disposition of the Case in the District Court 
Plaintiff, the Tretheway Family Trust, brought this action seeking a 
declaratory judgment that it did not have to reconvey certain real property pledged to 
secure a $150,000 loan plaintiff made to defendants until certain conditions in addition to 
the payment of $150,000 were met. The district court granted defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and entered its Amended Final Judgment on May 24, 2000, requiring 
plaintiff to execute a reconveyance. The district court also awarded defendants attorney 
fees. Plaintiff filed its Motion for New Trial on June 21, 2000, which the district court 
denied on October 4, 2000. The district court also denied plaintiffs alternative motion to 
amend its complaint. 
Statement of Facts. 
On or about January 25, 1999, plaintiff, through one of its trustees Richard 
L. Tretheway, negotiated a loan to defendants Blair Nebeker and Robert Furstenau, who 
were partners. R. 26; 73. All negotiations were done by and between Tretheway and 
Nebeker. R. 128. The loan was evidenced by a promissory note (the "Promissory Note") 
and trust deed (the "Trust Deed"). R. 92-97 and 99-104. Mr. Tretheway wrote the 
Promissory Note, and the Trust Deed was on a standard form prepared by First American 
Title Insurance Company, who was handling the escrow. R. 73. 
Both the Promissory Note and Trust Deed stated that they were secured by 
the same two parcels of real property described in exhibits to those documents. One 
parcel was some apartment property (the ''Apartment Property") and the other parcel was 
a gasoline station (the ;;Gas Station Property"). R. 96 and 97. The Trust Deed had one 
exhibit attached, an Exhibit A, describing both parcels, R. 104, while the Promissory Note 
had two exhibits attached, an Exhibit A describing the Apartment Property, and an 
Exhibit B describing the Gas Station Property. R. 96-97. 
The face amount of the Promissory Note was $150,000.00, and the same 
amount was referred to in the trust deed. R. 92 and 99. The Promissory Note, however, 
had an additional provision not found in the Trust Deed that specifically required that 
another obligation also owed to plaintiff by defendant Nebeker (the ;;DiCamillo Note") be 
paid before plaintiff was obligated to reconvey the Gas Station Property. R. 94. The 
provisions of the Promissory Note regarding release of the property securing the note are 
as follows: 
RELEASES 
1. THIS NOTE IS SECURED IN ADDITION TO 
OTHER SECURITY BY A SECOND TRUST DEED ON 
THE PROPERTY ATTACHED HERETO AS EXHIBIT 
"A." Lender will give a partial release for each condominium 
[sic] sold upon the property upon the payment of the sum of 
$20,000.00 per condominimum [sic] sold to the Lender. 
2. Upon the payment of $150,000 to Lender and 
there has been no default in any of the payments by 
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Borrowers to Lender the Trust Deed described in Exhibit 'TV' 
shall be released. 
3. The first trust deed on the property described in 
Exhibit w4B" attached hereto shall be released on the payment 
of the sum of $53,400.00 for the purchase of the note 
Described as the Camillo note, now owned by the Tipton 
Family Trust for the sum of $53,400.00 plus interest in the 
sum of $5,696.00 which is interest due as of February 1, 1999 
plus interest at the rate of $712.00 per month thereafter until 
paid, plus any and all attorney fees paid to Paul Halliday in 
the case of Dicamillo vs Tipton and Tipton vs Kathryn 
Abbott. 
R. 94. Exhibit A to the Promissory Note was the description of the Apartment Property, 
and Exhibit B to the Promissory Note was the description of the Gas Station Property. 
R. 96 and 97. The Promissory Note also provided that any conflict between the 
Promissory Note and the Trust Deed would be resolved by following the Promissory 
Note's provisions. R. 94. 
On or about June 23, 1999, Furstenau and Nebeker paid plaintiff 
$150,000.00, plus interest, and plaintiff reconveyed the Apartment Property. Plaintiff, 
however, did not reconvey the Gas Station Property because the DiCamillo Note had not 
been repaid. R. 88-89. Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that it was entitled to be 
paid on the DiCamillo Note before it was required to reconvey the Gas Station Property 
under the provisions of the Promissory Note. R. 1-3. 
The parties filed motions for summary judgment on the key issue in the 
case. Defendant Nebeker filed an affidavit in the district court on behalf of plaintiff 
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admitting that the intent of the parties was that the DiCamilla Note be paid off before the 
Gas Station Property was to be reconveyed. R. 127-28.. That affidavit reads in part: 
5. I agreed that he [Tretheway] would not have to 
release the security on the gas station until all the monies due 
Tipton on the note are paid. I told him that upon payment of 
the $150,000 we would get a complete release as to the 
condos (to which he (Tretheway) agreed) but he would not 
have to release gas station property until the 
Tipton-DiCamillo principal, interest, and all attorney fees to 
Paul Halliday were paid. 
6. Part of the consideration for the loan of $150,000 
was that the Tipton-DiCamillo Note would be paid off before 
a release would be given to the gas station. Without the 
agreement to pay off the Tipton-DiCamillo note Tretheway 
would not lend us the money. I explained this to Forstenau 
and he agreed as long as the Tipton-Camillo [sic] note would 
be assigned to us upon Tretheway being paid off. 
R. 127-28. 
The district court, however, ruled that plaintiff was required to reconvey 
both the Apartment Property and Gas Station Property upon the payment of $150,000 by 
defendants.1 R. 144-48. The district court found that the Promissory Note 
"unambiguously" required this result, despite the provisions of the note regarding the 
DiCamilla Note, and despite defendant Nebeker's affidavit. R. 146-47.. 
1
 Subsequently, defendant Forstenau found a buyer for the Gas Station 
Property, and he and plaintiff agreed that defendant would put $70,240 of the proceeds in 
escrow and plaintiff would reconvey the Gas Station Property. It was further agreed 
between the parties "that nothing in this agreement shall be construed to waive or nullify 
the parties rights claimed in Trethewav v. Furstenau, Case No.990908053; both parties 
continue to assert their positions (as stated in the pleadings and motions)." 
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An Amended Judgment was entered May 24, 2000, after Furstenau filed an 
amended affidavit for attorney fees. R. 215-17. Plaintiff filed a Motion for New Trial, 
or A Motion to Amend the Pleadings seeking to include a causes of action for money 
damages and reformation of the Trust Deed to be consistent with the Promissory Note. 
On September 25, 2000, all of plaintiff s motions were denied and the previous amended 
final judgment was affirmed. R. 254-57. The district court's ruling on these motions was 
entered October 4, 2000. R. 254. Plaintiff filed its notice of appeal on October 23. 2000. 
R. 267-68. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Promissory Note and Trust Deed must be considered as one agreement 
and read together to know the intent of the parties. The Promissory Note provided, by 
reference to the property descriptions attached as exhibits, that the Gas Station Property 
would not be reconveyed until the DiCamilla Note was paid, and the Promissory Note 
also provided that its provisions controlled any conflict between it and the Trust Deed. 
Because the Promissory Note was drafted specifically for this transaction and the Trust 
Deed did not reference the DiCamilla Note, the provisions of the Promissory Note should 
control. Plaintiff should not be required to give a reconveyance for the Gas Station 
Property until the DiCamilla Note is paid. 
To the extent the Court believes the intent of the parties is not clear from 
the Promissory Note and Trust Deed, defendant Nebeker admitted in his affidavit that 
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plaintiffs version of the facts is correct. The district court erred in not considering this 
undisputed affidavit and in not entering summary judgment for plaintiff. At the very 
least, the Nebeker affidavit, together with an affidavit submitted by plaintiff, creates a 
genuine issue of material fact that precluded summary judgment for defendants. 
Finally, plaintiffs post-judgment motion to amend should have been 
granted. The undisputed affidavit of defendant Nebeker demonstrates that the parties 
intended that the Gas Station Property would not be released until the DiCamillo Note 
was also paid off. The district court, however, ruled that plaintiff was required by the 
"unambiguous" terms of the Promissory Note to reconvey both the Apartment Property 
and Gas Station Property when $150,000 was paid. Plaintiff should have been allowed, 
in light of the district court's interpretation of the agreement, to state a claim for 
reformation to show the true intentions of the parties were different than the supplied 
''unambiguous" interpretation by the district court. 
ARGUMENT 
Standard of Review 
Summary Judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of fact exist 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) 
""Because entitlement to summary judgment is a question of law we accord no deference 
to the trial court's resolution of the legal issues presented.'" Salt Lake County Comm 'n v. 
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Salt Lake County Attorney, 985 P. 2d. 899, 902 (Utah 1999) (quoting K& Tine. v. 
Koroulis, 898 P. 2d. 623, 627 (Utah 1994)). 
I. The Provisions of the Trust Deed and Promissory Note Must be 
Construed Together, Considering Each Provision in Relation to the 
Others. 
The parties executed a Trust Deed and Promissory Note on February 1, 
1999. The Trust Deed was a form supplied by the title company. The Promissory Note 
was prepared by Mr. Tretheway specifically for this transaction. Because these two 
documents comprise the agreement of the parties, they must be construed together. 
n[U]nder established Utah law, when two agreements are 'executed substantially 
contemporaneously and are clearly interrelated, they must be construed as a whole and 
harmonized if possible.'" Shields v. Harris, 934 P.2d 653 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting 
Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 109 (Utah 1991)). 
The Promissory Note and the Trust Deed were signed on the same day 
regarding the same loan and each document referred to the other. As such, they must be 
construed as one agreement and harmonized together. 
II. Contracts Are to be Interpreted So that AH Elements of the Contract 
are Given Effect. 
In construing the contracts, ui[t]he basic rule of contract interpretation is 
that the intent of the parties is to be ascertained from the content of the instrument itself.... 
Each contract provision is to be considered in relation to all of the others, with a view 
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toward giving effect to all and ignoring none."' Plateau Mining Co. v Utah Div. of State 
Lands and Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990)(emphasis added)(quoting Utah 
Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 1061-62 (Utah 1981)). 
The Promissory Note sets forth in detail how a release of the property 
securing the Promissory Note could be obtained. By referencing the two different parcels 
by different exhibits, Exhibit A being the Apartment Property and Exhibit B being the 
Gas Station Property, it becomes clear which release provision applies to which parcel. 
The first release provision applies only to "Exhibit * A'" and allows a piecemeal payment 
on the obligation and a corresponding piecemeal release of the Apartment Property by 
individual condominium unit. R. 94. The second release provision also applies only to 
''Exhibit CA"' and allows release of all of the Apartment Property by payment of 
$150,000. R. 94. 
In contrast the third release expressly applies only to the property 
referenced in ''Exhibit 'B, '" which was the Gas Station Property. That provision states in 
relevant part: 
The first trust deed on the property described in Exhibit "B" 
attached hereto shall be released on the payment of the sum of 
$53,400.00 for the purchase of the note Described as the 
Camillo note,. . . plus interest in the sum of $5,696.00 which 
is interest due as of February 1, 1999, plus interest at the rate 
of $712.00 per month thereafter until paid . . . 
R. 94. 
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This provision, securing the outstanding DiCamillo debt by the Gas Station 
Property, which was the only property described in Exhibit B to the Promissory Note, is 
precise and unambiguous. Defendants were required to satisfy the DiCamillo note before 
receiving a release of the Exhibit B property, or the Gas Station Property. The district 
court overlooked this when it ruled that plaintiff was required to reconvey all of the 
property securing the Promissory Note. 
The Court, furthermore, should give particular emphasis to the provisions of 
the Promissory Note. The Promissory Note is the only document actually prepared by the 
parties as a statement of their intentions. 'The Trust Deed was a printed form contract. 
When words are inserted in a printed form of a contract, the inserted words take 
precedence over the printed matter. See, e. g., Bank ofEphraim v. Davis, 559 P.2d 538, 
540 (Utah 1977); Steenburg Constr. Co. v. PrePakt Concrete Co., 381 F.2d 768 (10th Cir. 
1967); and Holland v. Brown, 394 P.2d 77, 15 Utah 2d 422 (1964). While the cases cited 
refer to one contract in which there were handwritten interlineations, this principle should 
be equally applicable when construing two contracts together where one contract is a 
form contract and the other one drafted and agreed to by the parties. 
The Promissory Note also specifically provided that "If there is any conflict 
between the terms of this note and the Trust Deed securing this note, the terms of the 
note are controlling." R. 94 (emphasis added). Thus, the parties contemplated the 
Promissory Note as the governing instrument of their agreement. As such, the 
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Promissory Note's provision concerning the satisfaction of the outstanding DiCamillo 
note before the Gas Station Property could be released should control. 
III. Defendant Nebeker Confirmed the Parties Agreed the Gas Station 
Property Would Also Secure the DiCamillo Note. 
Defendant Nebeker confirmed by affidavit submitted to the district court 
that the agreement of the parties concerning the Gas Station Property was as reflected in 
the third release provision: that the Gas Station Property would be released only upon 
payment of the DiCamillo Note. Nebeker testified as follows: 
5. I agreed that he [Tretheway] would not have to 
release the security on the gas station until all the monies due 
Tipton on the note are paid. I told him that upon payment of 
the $150,000 we would get a complete release as to the 
condos (to which he (Tretheway) agreed) but he would not 
have to release gas station property until the 
Tipton-DiCamillo principal, interest, and all attorney fees to 
Paul Halliday were paid. 
6. Part of the consideration for the loan of $150,000 
was that the Tipton-DiCamillo Note would be paid off before 
a release would be given to the gas station. Without the 
agreement to pay off the Tipton-DiCamillo note Tretheway 
would not lend us the money. I explained this to Forstenau 
and he agreed as long as the Tipton-Camillo [sic] note would 
be assigned to us upon Tretheway being paid off. 
R. 127-28. 
This could not be clearer, and it is a statement by the party who conducted 
negotiations for defendants. Yet, the district court appeared to focus on the language of 
the second release provision of the Promissory Note, which reads in part that ;i[u]pon the 
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payment of $150,000.00 to Lender . . . the Trust Deed described in Exhibit *A' shall be 
released/' R. 94. When drafting the Promissory Note, it appears the word "property" 
was intended to follow the words 'Trust Deed/' There was no Trust Deed described in 
Exhibit A to the Promissory Note, but there was Trust Deed property described in 
Exhibit A. R. 96. Exhibit A contained only the property description for the Apartment 
Property. R. 96. Exhibit A did not contain a trust deed and Exhibit A did not contain a 
description of the Gas Station Property. Thus, the reference to Exhibit A in that release 
provision, contrary to the district court's interpretation, could only have authorized the 
release of the Apartment Property. The district court erred in this interpretation. 
At best, the district court's interpretation suggests the release provisions of 
the Promissory Note were ambiguous. That would require the district court to look to 
parol evidence of the parties intention, and the Nebeker Affidavit provided clear evidence 
that the parties intended the Gas Station Property to be held as security for payment of the 
DiCamillo Note. The district court's decision should be reversed. 
IV. Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Should Have Been Granted. 
After the district court interpreted the written agreement of the parties as 
requiring the reconveyance of both the Apartment Property and Gas Station Property, 
plaintiff moved to amend its complaint to reform the agreement according to the 
intentions of the parties. Prior to that time, both parties argued the written language of the 
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Promissory Note supported their positions. Before the district court ruled, plaintiff 
believed it had no reason to plead a claim for reformation of the written agreement. 
The district court denied the motion to amend. The court should have 
allowed amendment because reformation of an instrument, including a deed, is 
appropriate when it is clear that it does not reflect the intentions of the parties. Hottinger 
v. Jensen, 684 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah 1984) ("Reformation . . . is appropriate where the 
terms of the written instrument are mistaken in that they do not show the true intent of the 
agreement between the parties.") Plaintiff submitted the affidavits of Richard L. 
Tretheway and defendant Nebeker declaring that plaintiffs interpretation of the agreement 
was the interpretation intended—that the Gas Station Property was not to be reconveyed 
until the DiCamilla Note was paid off. R. 86-104; 127-28. Mr. Tretheway and defendant 
Nebeker were the only parties involved in the negotiations of the agreement. R. 128. 
Amendment was appropriate at that late stage in proceedings to allow the case to be tried 
on the merits of the facts before the district court and on appropriate claims that are 
supported by the undisputed facts that were before the district court before it ruled. 
In Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty West Development, Inc., 970 P. 2d 
1273 (Utah 1998), the trial court had dismissed a portion of plaintiffs case then refused to 
grant plaintiffs motion to amend the complaint. The refusal to allow amendment was 
made without comment. In overruling the trial court's denial of the motion to amend, the 
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Utah Supreme Court analyzed possible justifications for the refusal and found none. That 
court wrote: 
Aurora seeks to amend its complaint to state an alternative 
theory of recovery. . . based almost entirely on facts already in 
evidence, the court should liberally allow amendment because 
the opposing party is then generally prepared to address such 
a claim. 
Id. at 1282. 
Plaintiff sought to prove that the agreement contained a mutual mistake 
because the parties intended something entirely different than what the district court said 
the written documents supposedly "unambiguously" stated. Even if the terms of a 
contract or deed are unambiguous, they can still be reformed if they do not reflect the 
intentions of the parties. Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1392 (Utah 1996) ("where 
the document is unambiguous on its face, the challenging party must present proof of 
mistake by clear and convincing evidence*'). In a case claiming mutual mistake, the 
court can admit parol evidence of the parties intent to determine whether the parties 
actually intended something different than was contained in the writing. Warner v. 
Sirs tins, 838 P.2d 666, 669 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("Parol evidence is admissible to show 
the writing did not conform to the intent of the parties.") 
Plaintiff presented an affidavit of defendant Nebeker stating clearly that the 
parties intended the Gas Station Property to secure payment of the DiCamillo Note as 
well as the Promissory Note in this case. R. 127-28. Nebeker was the only defendant 
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who participated in the negotiations with plaintiff. R. 128. This evidence was in the 
record before the district court ruled on the motions for summary judgment. The district 
court ignored this evidence then and later refused to allow plaintiff to amend its complaint 
to state a claim for reformation. 
Thus, even if this Court agrees with the district court that the Promissory 
Note and Trust Deed in this case as written required both parcels of property to be 
reconveyed upon the payment of $150,000, the Court should remand the case to the 
district court to allow plaintiff to state a claim for reformation. The evidence is clear that 
the parties intended the DiCamilla Note be secured by the Gas Station Property and that 
the Gas Station Property did not need to be reconveyed until the DiCamilla Note was 
paid. The intentions of the parties negotiating the deal should be given effect. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the district court and 
remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this [io_ day of February, 2001. 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
Larry Svjerjxins \ j 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this _[4 day of February, 2001,1 caused to be hand 
delivered two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant, to the following: 
David M. Wahlquist 
Merrill F. Nelson 
Kirton & McConkie 
60 South Temple, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Attornev for Defendant Robert Furstenau 
d^M^-. 
S \WPDATA\PLEADING\TRETHEWAY NEBEKER APPELLANT BRIEF vvpd 
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ADDENDUM 
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.1 eg mr:m coutf 
rl>,.:J'i<i^a\ District 
D. DAVID LAMBERT, (1872), and 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, (3752), and 
KENNETH PARKINSON (6778), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
3£? \ 1 tS93 
J \kbpx tretheway atf 
Our File No 25,213 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SANDRA L. TRETHEWAY, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
ROBERT FURSTENAU, BLAIR 
NEBEKER, U.P.N.L.C, and 
ADVANCE PROPERTIES 
INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Nevada 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD L. 
TRETHEWAY 
Civil No 990908053 
Judge Leslie A Lewis 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
RICHARD L. TRETHEWAY, being first duly sworn, states: 
1. I, along with Sandra Tretheway, am a Trustee of the Tretheway Family Trust. 
2. On or about January 25, 1999, I received a phone call from Blair Nebeker with 
whom I had previously done business on several occasions. 
3. At the time of the call, Nebeker owed and was in default on a previous loan 
between the Trust and Nebeker (the "Camillo" note). 
4. Nebeker requested another loan from the Tretheway Family Trust for the purchase 
of a gas station. 
5. I indicated that the Trust was not willing to enter into any new agreements with 
Nebeker unless the Camillo debt was also taken care of; the Trust was still making interest 
payments on the outstanding Camillo debt. 
6. Nebeker stated that he and his partner, Robert Furstenau, a successful contractor, 
were willing to incorporate satisfaction of the Camillo debt into a new agreement as 
consideration for obtaining a $150,000 loan for the purpose of purchasing a gas station. 
7. The Trust had not previously had any dealings with Furstenau, however, Nebeker 
stated that Furstenau was willing to incorporate the Camillo debt into the new loan agreement 
because the profit from the gas station was expected to be significant and quick in coming; 
Furstenau would receive a contract for improvements on the property as well as profits within 
six months of at least $75,000. 
8. Nebeker stated that he and Furstenau would transfer to the Trust the gas station they 
intended to buy an apartment complex they had recently purchased and were converting into 
condominium units as security for the cash loan and the outstanding Camillo debt. 
9. Nebeker stated that the gas station would not have to be reconveyed until the 
Camillo debt was satisfied. 
2 
10. I indicated that the Trust was not willing to make this agreement without such a 
provision assuring satisfaction of the Camillo debt. 
11. I drafted a Promissory Note that reflected the agreement we had reached. 
12. The following day Nebeker and I met to review the note; Nebeker indicated that 
Furstenau wanted a partial release provision for the condominiums included in the Note as the 
condominiums were currently being sold. I revised the Note to include a partial release 
provision for reconveyance of the apartment/condominium complex. (See Exhibit A) 
13. Nebeker again stated that he and Furstenau were willing to condition release of the 
gas station trust property on satisfaction of the Camillo debt. 
14. I gave Nebeker the Promissory Note and told him to put the deal together. 
15. I did not prepare the Trust Deed; Defendants obtained it from First American Title 
Insurance Co. who was handling the escrow. (See Exhibit B) 
16. The Promissory Note and Trust Deed were signed by Robert Furstenau and Blair 
Nebeker on February 1,1999. Throughout the negotations process I did not deal with 
Fursteneau, only Nebeker. 
17. On or about June 23, 1999, Defendants paid a $150,000 loan owing on the note, 
but did not pay $53,400, plus interest, to satisfy an outstanding debt, the "Camillo" note, that 
was incorporated into the Promissory Note under Release Provision No. 3. 
18. Plaintiff has reconveyed the apartment/condominium complex, but has retained 
the gas station property for security on the outstanding Camillo debt as described and agreed 
upon by both parties in Release Provision No. 3 of the Promissory Note. The Camillo note was 
a large part of the consideration for the $150,000 loan and is an integral part of the agreement 
between the parties. 
DATED this i 7 day of September, 1999. 
' • -• .••'• •' -,-r^' „•• ' ' y 
. • . - ' • • : • > ; . , • - * '-• ""'"/..* ' .-•"••••'• It^- **-?y 
j
 }.- -
RICHARD L. TRETHEWAY 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this / / day of September, 1999. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the following, 
postage prepaid, this 1 I day of September, 1999. 
David M. Wahlquist 
Merrill F. Nelson 
Kirton & McConkie 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84145-0120 
/*. 
SECRETARY u>~" " "' 
r r 
PROMISSORY MOTF SECURED BY AflpiGNMgNT Q? NOTF AND DEED 07 H'yy.gr 
BUSINESS LOAN 
Amount: $150, 000 .00 Salt. Lake City , Ut. 
Interest Hate: 15* Date: February 1, 199 9 
PARTIES: 
Lender; Sandra Tratheway, Trustee of the Trethevay Family 
Trust, dated Nay 9, 1931, whose residence and mailing address is 
2013 Spring Oaks Dr. Surinoville, Ut. 84SS3 and will be referred to 
as "Lender". 
Borrowers: Blair Nebeker 
1212 E. MOSS 
MIDVALE, UT. 8 4 0 5 7 PI-TONE 8 0 1 5 5 3 5 7 7 7 
CRSTENAU 
7579 S. MARY ESTER CIRCLE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
N. L.C. 
1212 E. MOSS 
MIDVALE, UT. S4057 PHO^ JS 301 5585777 
ADVANCED PROPERTIES INTERNATIONAL, INC, A 
NEVADA CORPORATION 
1212 E. MOSS 
MIOVALS, UT, 34057 PHONE S01 5535777 
BORROWER'S PROMISE: 
In return for a loan We have received of Si5O,0OC.Q0 
this amount will be called "principal") , ZORROVfERS promise to pay 
to the order of Lender, at the above address as fellows: 
PRINCIPAL AND INTEREST: 
BORROWERS will repay to the Lender the principal amount cf 
the loan with interest at the rate cf I5f* per year until the full 
amount of the loan has b^en repaid: Interest to ceminence the 1 cay 
of FEBRUARY , \S99 . The monthly payment of interest shall be nicdc: 
on the first day of each and every month commencing MARCH 1, l^SS 
which shall be Che sum cf $1575.00 per month on the firsc day of 
each month commencing March 1, 1999 paid directly from Borrower to 
Lender -
FULL PAYMENT: 
The unpaid balance of the LOAN and any unpaid internst 
shall be completely paid on or before August 1, 1999 
1 
Exhibit 1 
BOB 
U.F. 
PREPAYMENT PENALTY: 
Even though BORROWER is noc required Co do so, BORROWER may 
make ether payment:s Co pay off the loan in addition to the payments 
described above without penalty. 
APPLICATION OF PAYMENTS: 
Any payments BORROWERS make will be used first to pay the 
interest due on the loan, second to pay any penalties and the 
balance shall be applied to the loan balance, 
IMMEDIATE PAYMENT: 
If BORROWERS fail to make any payments required by thin 
Promissory Loan Note, trie Lender will have che right to demand that 
BORROWERS immediately pay the full amount of che balance of the 
loan and any interest chat We owe on that amount. 
On payments there, is no grace period. The money to be in 
LENDERS POSSESSION on the due date. " So long as the envelope is 
postmarked 4 days prior to che due date of Che monthly payment it 
is deemed to arrive on time. If postmarked after 4 days or ia not 
sent co che correct address the dace of delivery to lender io 
determined by actual delivery. Borrower in addition to all other 
penalties set forth herein shall pay S2S0.00 for ^^.cn late psym^nt 
en demand of Lender. 
In che event Borrower fails to make any two payments, 
consecutively or otherwise, when due, the interest race gees Co 
21V for ail the pasc due payments and until three months three 
months payments are made when due ,a When three consecutive month? 
payments are made on time Che interest drops back down to 15%-. 11' 
not the penalty continues uncil three consecutive months have been 
paid on Cime. If there are two late payments again at any time 
during the period of the loan the same applies again and the 21V 
continues until che note is paid off. The 21%* rate also becomes 
effective if the Borrower allows the property to go into 
foreclosure or the borrower goes into bankruptcy whether voluntary 
or involuntary. 
{Zhe foregoing is not an extension of time to pay but is strictly 
a penalty provision to get borrower to pay en time. 
COLLECTION COSTS: 
If che Lender must: hire an attorney co help collect any 
cayments Borower required Co make by this Promissory Lean Noes, or 
to*collect Che unpaid loan principal and interest, Sorrower agreeb 
to pay the Lender's attorney a reasonable fee. If a lawsuit^:" 
filed co collect on this Promissory Loan Note, Borrower will a-3^ 
pay, m addition to a reasonable attorney's fee, Che Lender's court 
2 
r\ f> P n ^  
costs . 
By signing this Note, everyone who lias signed as a Borrower 
understands that ho or she could be held individually and 
personally responsible for repayment of the whole unpaid loan 
amount, plus interest, attorney's fees and court costs. That is, 
the Lender may collect the whole unpaid amount of the loan from any 
or^e of us without having to collect from any other signer. 
TRUST DEED 
IN THE EVENT OF FORECLOSURE OR THE ADVANCEMENT OF ANY MONIES 
ANY AND ALL MONIES DUE UNDER THE NOTE PLUS ALL C0S7S OF FORECLOSURE 
AND/OR ANY ADVANCES OF FUNDS MADE BY LENDERS TO PROTECT THE 
SECURITY OF THIS LOAN SHALL BEAR INTEREST AT THE HATE OF 2Q*n PER 
ANNUM, NON COMPOUNDED, 
POINTS; 
Any points paid in advance "on account of this loan are 
considered premiums and shall not he applied to the reduction of 
principal or any interest payments. 
CONFLICT: If there is any conflict between the terms of this note 
and the Trust Deed securing this note, the terms of the note are 
controlling. 
RELEASES; 
1. THIS NOTE IS SECURED IN ADDITION TO OTHER SECURITY BY A 
SECOND TRUST DEED ON THE PROPERTY ATTACHED HERETO AS EXHIBIT "A" 
Lender will give a partial release for each condommum sold upon 
the property upon the payment of the sum cf $20,000.00 per 
condeminitrtum sold no the Lender. 
2. Upon the payment of $130,00 0.0 0 to Lender and there has 
been no default in any of the payments by Ecrrowers to Lender the 
Trust Deed described in Exhibit: "A" shall be released. 
3. The first trust deed en the property described in Exhibit 
MB" attached hereto shall be released on the payment of the som of 
$53,400.00 for the purchase of the note Described as the Camilio 
note, now owned by Tipton Family Trusc for the sum of $53,400.00 
plus interest in the sum of $5,69a.00 which is interet due as of 
February 1, 1999 plus interest at the rate of $712,00 per month 
thereafter until paid, plus any and all attorney fees paid to Paul 
Halliday in the case of Dicamiilo vs Tipton and Tipton vs Kathryn 
Abbott. Upon payment of same Tiptcn shall assign the note and Deed 
of trust to Blair Nebeker along with any papers necessary to 
transfer the case to Nebeker and- make him the Plaintiff in i?cid 
case . 
3 
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Nebekcr will hold Tiptcn Family Trust free and harn-.les from any 
damages arising out of the Dicarru.Ho note. 
"BORROWERS" 
Blair Nebeksr 
1212 E. MOSS 
MIDVALE, UT. 840 PK0N2 801 5535777 
BOB FURSTENAU) 
7579 S. 
SALT LAX3 CITY, UTAH, 
U.P. N. L.C, 
121?. E. MOSS 
MIDVALE, UT. 8 4057 PHONE 801 5535777 
ADVANCED PROPERTIES i^^RNATIIONXL, INC, A 
NEVADA CORPORATION --1212 E. MOSS 7 JhlJ4/- flMwU~-~~r fR£5-
MIDVALE, UT. 04057 PHONE 301 553577/ 
0! • '•'• j j 
^J0^S$-
<Scc o T "3 ^«^? 
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E D 
^^jjPU
 P , aJ^QCB wui QpAJL *• 
'ij^bar^&xrrsr* *aiTsTiE» l 
-%* BOS ^jasT2SAcr DOIXABS 
£ d « t t * r good i n d . ^ ^ < x o * * r ^ 
l ^ CBOO-T^ 4«cr>rZ wet <ff * « * » 
;Shk5iix4*r^-*ax;^r» IS09. 
CLABK3 UTOJG TSUST 
. / ^ ^ 
ftft^Pr* ^W> 
Form No. 1344-A (1982) ORDER NO. 490534 
ALIA P l a i n Language Cc*nnitrrj*r;i; 
DESCRIPTION 
Esgir j i i rg a t tha Socchwefct: corner of COUNTRY CLUB -SIGHTS, Plac "A11, 
and rur j i ing thenca Korch Q°01' East: 215.79 f a s t ; t bancs South 51*02' 
Ease 3<S fpeat; choice Nc+th 33*45' Wasc, 263,31 fsex to che poin t cr-
bfiginujng. 
The above descr ibed p rope r ty a l so Jcncwn by chs screen address of; 
24£0 sas? PASisys wir, S^LT^IAKS CITY, L*IAH S4io3 
//fc ^^,/5 
c /v '7 / /> / 
' ! M • •' i 
WHEN RECORDED MAIL TO 
Sandra Tretheway, Trustee 
c/o Tretheway Law Offices 
2013 Spring Oaks Drive 
Spnngvillc, Utaii 84663 
E-490594AW 
DEED OF TRUST 
^WITLl ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS 
This Deed of! rust, made this J _ _ _ day of February, 1999, between Blair Ncbeker, Bob Turstenau, 
U P N , L C , and Advanced Property International, Inc , a Nevada corporation, as Trustor, whose address is 
. FIRST AMERICAN TITLE 
INSURAiNCE COMPANY, a C.Uifoniin corporation - Utnh Division, as Trustee, and Saadia Tretheway, 
Trustee of the Tretheway Family Trust, dated May 9, 1991, as Beneficiary, WITNESS That Trustor 
CONVUYS AND WARRANTS to trustee in trust, with p owcr of sale, the following described property, 
situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
Sec Exhibit A" attached and made a part hereof 
Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water lights, lights of way, easements, 
rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, puvileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, now 
or hcieafler used or enjoyed with said properly, or any part thereof, SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power 
an authority hereinafter given to and conferred upon Beneficiary to collect and appiy such rents, issues, and 
profits 
For the Purpose of Securing: 
(\) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note of even date hereof m the principal sum 
of S\ 50,000 00, made by Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times, hi the manner and with interest 
as thcic n set forth, and any extensions and/or renewals or irod-fications thereof, (2) the performance of each 
agreement of Trustor herein contained, (3) the payment of such additional loans or advances as hereafter may 
be made to Trustoi, or his successors oi assigns, when evidenced by a promissory note or notes rcoung that they 
arc secured by this Deed of Trust, and (4) the payment of all sums expended or advanced by Beneficiary under 
or pursuant to the terms hcicof, together with interest thereon as heiem provided 
To Protect The Security of'lhis Deed ofTiust, Tru&tor Agrees: 
1 To keep s-ud properly in good condition and repau, -tol to remove or demolish any building iheicon »o complete or revere 
piompl'/ and in good and workmanlike manner nny bunding .vhich imy be constructed, dam igcd or dcsuoycJ ihcrcon, to con \uy widi 
all 1 iws, covenants nnd restrictions affecting siul property not to commit or permit ,v uslc thereof, not to commit suTsi or pcrnit in/ act 
upon said piupcrty in violation of law to do all other act? which horn (lie chdracte. or use of said property may be rcisombiy necessary, 
(he s-peulL cnumetaliuns herein not exciudu g the gcncial and if (he 'can seemed hcicby cr any part thereof is being obla ncd U the 
purpu.se of financing construction of impiovcmcits on said piopciiy Irustor further agrees 
(Q) TO commence construction promptly md to pursue sainc with ica>unable diligence to eomplc on in accordinc 
witli plans and specifications satisfactory to Bcneliciary, and 
(b) To allow. Denciiei Jiy to tnsnee* said urope-ty nt al{ Junes cJuiM,g ecns'.^aho-
Tra-itcw, upon picscnUlion to t of in id davit ^ u e d by Beneficiary, selling forth facts showing a default by 1 ruiiur undei >is 
nu»nbc» cd par-graph, i* authorized to accept as true nnd conclusive all fae s and statements Ihci ein, and to act (hereon here uJe-
2 (o provide and maintain insuance of such type or'/pes nnd amounts as Beneficiary may rcquiie, on the in prove nc Us rovv 
existing ur hci e idcr erected or placed on said property Such insurance shall be earned in comp tnies approved by Bcnclc dry wibi loss 
pityaole c'nuses m fiworol and in (onn nccepl-tblc to Beneficiary In liie event of lo«s, Trustor shall give mmicdiate notice o Scncfieury, 
who may naKc prool ot losa, md each insurance company concerned is hereby aulhon/ed and directed lo nuke pnyme H roi su« \ 'oss 
diiectly to Beneficiary, instead of lo Trustor and Dcieficiniy jointly and die nsurincc proceeds or any p^it thereof maybe ippned by 
Denefici iry at JLS option, to the i eduction of the indebtedness hcicby sccuicd ur to die i coloration or repair of he property dmngc i In 
tlie event tluit die 1 msior ilull fad to provide ^alisiiicloiy hazaid insurance tiic Denellcidjy may pixxjrc o\\ tl e 1 rustor'i behrlf maui a ice 
in favor of the licncficinry alone If instance cannot be secured by the Trustor to provide the tequued covejage, this will constitute u\ 
act of default undei (Jiu terms of thi* Deed of i o n i 
3. To deliver lo. pay for and mnintoin ^ ^ V * ? ^ ^ wrcnewals (hereof or supplements 
as Beneficiary may require, including abstracts of title or polices ol t.tie in.u. j 
thereto. 
r „ - numor-J-E to affect OK security hereof, the lillc to said property, or the rights 
4. To appear in «KI defend any action "[ P ^ ^ ^ ° Je^e = o appearin or defend any - e h acbon or proceeding, to pay 
or power, of Beneficiary or Trustee; and should D ^ ^ r ° ™ ^ i n a ' w u u n b | , sum inclined by Beneficiary or r^slce. 
ail costs and expenses, including cost of evidence of title and attorney s H-wS 
, .n',v.i;,,» <i!,' nmncitv includinE all assessments upon 
5. Topay aliens 10 day* before delinquency nil laxc. or.d — ^ X c S i * ^ p r o p e r t y ; U, pny, .hen 
water company stack and nil rent*. assessments mid charges fur water epn u <-mmt toor
 i o ^ o(. f 
due, .ll encumbrances, charges, and Hens with inlcrwt, «« said property oi nny part tocor, wh.e. y 
hereto; to pity all costs, fees, and expenses of tins I rust. 
,„,.,,„,! KV Pcncficiarv in Its discretion, sufficient lo pay all taxes 
6. To pay to Beneficiary monthly, in advance .n » ™ ' » l - » " J ' ^ ^ S S OK: same . M l become due. 
and assessments affecting said property, and nil premiums on insurance Ihere.or, as ana 
7. Should Tn, ,or f.i, to make any payment or to do any a c t , ^ ^ ^ t S ^ ^ ^ ^ 
obligation so to do and without notice to or demand upon Trustor and wUhoul T ™ » ^
 D<6 o r . ^ ^ ^ 
or do d,e same in such manner and lo such extent as either mny deem " « « W 7 ' 3 ^ I U , m y ac t ion or preceding pu.yoriinB to alTecl 
authorized to oiler upon said property Tor such purposes; commence, appear in.and actcm encumbrance, charge or 
,h« security hereof or the rights ur powers of Beneficiary or I nw.ee; pny P ^ ' j ^ S ^
 s, L u r any liability, expend 
lien which in the judgment of cither appears to be prior or superior hereto, » ^ ' » « £ ^ f evidence
 o f mie, employ counsel, and pay 
whatever amounts in its absolute discretion it may deem necessary therc.or, inducing co. 
his reasonable fees. 
. i L t „ u H^uenci-iv ur Trustee, with interest from dnte of 
8. To nay immediately and without demand all sums expended hercu, de J ^ ^ ,
 b e ? c c m , d h c r c b y . 
expenditure nl the rate of Fiuecn Percent (15%) per nnnum until paid, and the icpn/mcnl m c o . 
,1,. „ , „ m . r i dutu in the amount of $350.00. Amounts in 
9. To pay to Beneficiary a "late charge" if any payment U not made on the payment dale 
default shall bear interest Ht a rate of 21% per annum. 
IT IS MUTUALLY AOREUD THAT: 
,0. Should . i d property or any part u W be taken or damaged by « ^ ^ J S ^ S S Z S t T £ 
proceeding, or damaged by fire, or earthquake or in any other manner, ^ ^ ^
 u[c i n ^ own name, any action or 
payments or relief therefor, and shall be entitled at its option to conunencc, ^pear n .n
 P col,H1,nsution, awards, 
proceedings, or lo make any compromise or settlement, >n connection w.th such Ux.ng C e n ^ I ^ 
damage,, rid.l* of action and proceeds, including the proceeds of any policies at ?. ^ ° " "
 l y n ^ m e I iny mdcb.cdness 
assigned to Beneficiary, who may. after deductin8 therefrom all .ts expenses, mclumng Oomcy s j ^ PS y J ^ ^ 
secured hereby. Trustor agrees lo execute such further assignments of any compensation. *w..rd. 
proceeds as Beneficiary or Trustee may require. 
rr, r •„,, „.,vnvnl of its fees and presentation of this Deed of 
1,. At any time and from time to time upon wnl.en request ° ^ ^ i C i ^ ^ ^ Z ^ Z .fleeting die liability of any person 
Trust and the -.ate for endorsement (in ease ^ ^ ^ ^ . o r ^ l ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ J . , ^ JT T n B l C 6 
for the payment of the indebtedness .secured hereby, and without releasing the mte a*. c' W ^ 6 
may (a) consent lo die making of any map or plat of said property; ( ) join in granhn ^ ^ l J ^
 ((f ^ o n y c x l c l , s i o a 0 , 
(e) join in any subordination or other agreement affecting tins Deed of ln is l oi U»e l.ui ot c w r y i A b
 rett(mveyance 
modilieation ofdie terms ofUlis loan; (e) reconvcy, wiUioul warranty, all « W P * 0 ^ ^ ^ ^ J ,
 f c(f l h c 
miv bo described as "die persons entitled thereto", and the rentals Uicrcm of any matter., ol tact. . na, 
S ^ n = « ^ r . Trus^r agrees to pay reasonable u W s fees for any of the servees menttoned m tins par,g l apl, 
,- • i • ii^^niimianee of U\«c trusts, all ren'.s, issues, ruynlties. 
12. As additional security, Trustor hereby ass.jms to Bcnel.emry. dvumg U , e « ^ ^ ° U .,
 T f $ |,aI1 d c f a u l l i n l h c 
and profits of the property an"==Ied by this Deed of Trust and of any personal P ^ ^ ^ r shall have die right to collect nil 
payment of ar,y indebtedness secured hereby or m the performance of any ^ " ^ " •
 m d l ; f a u U M ; l l - o r c , i V : j , 
such rent,, issues, royalties, and profits earned pner to default as diey beeonu. uuc and pay.o . ^
 u f ^ 
T a t a r ' s right to collect any ofsueh moneys shall cease and Beneficiary shad I, vedie r.^ht, wU, < r y ^
 & c | „ u , „0 
property afibeled hereby, to collect all rents, royalties, issues, and prot.L, ^ ^ ^ . f the right, power, and 
to time to collect any such moneys shall not in any manner affect ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ « , „ « , ;
 s | i a ,i be, or be eonstrued 
aud,ority to collect the same. Nomina, contained heroin, nor the exercise of Jv. r ft by^Hcnet 7 ^ 3ubl,rdinntion of d,e lien 
lo be, an affirmation by I3encfieiary of any tenancy, lease or option, nor an asswmpum o. ,..L.i. j 
or charge uf this Deed of Trust to any such tenancy, lease or option. 
U . U p o n . n y d e r . u U b y T n ^ ^ 
to be appointed by a court (Trastor hereby consenting to the appointment o Eeueficn, 7_ « sw.h 
adequ/c of any security lor the indebtedness hereby secured, enter upon ^ ^ ™ % ^ . o d ' a p p l y Z same, lea. costs 
own name sue for or oUierwise collect said rents, issues, and profits, including to P ^ due^n ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
and expenses of operation and collection, including reasonable attorney's fees, upon any indeoledncs. 
as Bcncfjciaiy may delenniiic. 
i n Cnn oi* ejuch rents issues, and profits, or die proceeds at 
14. The entering upon and Uking possession of said propeity. the colicuion o . ^ ^ ^ 'o p c r 1 y i flnJ the application or i c ic le 
lire and other mstinincc policies, or cocnpcwnlinn or awoj-J.. for any taking or amngc ' * ^ t d o n e p u r b U i m i to such noiicc. 
Of: '- 0(1 
15 The fmluieon thu pu t of Beneficiary lo ptemptly enforce any rght hereunder shall notupenite as a waiver of such right and 
ll;e waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not constitute* a waive: of any other or subsequent default. 
16 Tune id ot Ihc csscr.cc hoieof Upon default by Trustor m the payment of any indebtedness secured hcicby or in the 
performance of my agreement hereunder, nil sums secured hereby shall immediately become due and payable at the option of Bcncficiaiy 
In the event of such default, Bencfici uy mny uxcwUlc or cause Tiustce lo execute a v/ritlcn notice uf default, and of election to ciu^c sud 
property to be sold to satisfy the obligations hereof, and Trustee shall file such notice for rccoid In each county wheiem said piopeity or 
some part or puiect thereof is situated Ucneliciaiy also shall deposit with Trustee, the note and all documents evidencing expenditures 
secured hereby 
17 After the lapse of Mich time as may then be requued by luw following the recordation of *aid notice of default, and notice of 
default and notice of s^k having been given as then remmed by law, Trus'eo without demand on Trustor, .shall sell said propeity on the 
date and it the time and place designated in j»atd notice of sale cither a.s a whole or m .separate procoLs, and in such Older ILS it may detemme 
(but subject tu any statutory light of 'Iru.stor In due-t die under m which Siiidi property, tf consisting of scleral known lot? or parcels, shall 
be sold), at public oucuon to the highest biddei, the purchase pi ice payable m lawful money of the United States at {he time of sale. The 
person conducting the sale may, for any cause he deems expedient, postpone the sale from time to lime until it shall be completed and, in 
every suei\ case, notice of postponement shall be given by public declaration thcieuf by such poison at die tunc awd plnee las-l appointed 
for the Tale, piovidcd, if the sale is postponed for longer than one day beyond (lie day designated in the notice of sale, notice thereof shall 
be given m the same mannci as die original notice of s.atc. Tnistce shall execute and deliver to the purchaser its Deed conveying said 
property so Told, but widiout any covenant of warranty, c.xptess or implied The recital* m the Deed of any mntleis or facts shall be* 
conclusive pi oof of 1)70 tniliifulnesM thereof. Any poison, including Beneficiary, may bid at the sale. "IruMcc shall apply the piooecda of 
die i>ale to payment of (1) the cost nnd expenses of exercising die power of sale nnd of the sale, including the payment of die Trustees and 
attorney's fees, (2) cost of any evidence of tide procured in connection with such sale and icvcnuc stamos on Trustee's Deed; (3) all sums 
expended under Hie terms heicof, not then repaid, with accrued mleicst at 21% per annum fiom dale of expenditure, (4) all other bums 
the secured hcicby; and (5) the remainder, if any to the person or poisons legally entitled theieto, or the 'trustee, in its disci ction, may 
deposit die balance of such piocccds with the County Clerk of the county in which die vale took place 
1S Trustor agrees lo surrcndci possession of die heicmabovc descubed Trust property '0 die purchaser at the aforesaid sale, 
immediately afle such sale, m the event .sueh possession ha.s not previously been surrendered by 'I ru>lor 
19 Upon the occunence of any default hereunder, Beneficiary shall have \l\c opUon to dcclaie all -urns seemed hereby 
immediately due and payable <\[\d foreclose this Deed of Trust in the manner provided by law for the foicclosuie of mortgages on real 
properly and Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover J I such proceedings all costs and expenses incident thereto, including reasonable 
attorney s fee in such amount a3 shall be fixed by the court 
20 Beneficiary may appoint n successor trustee at any umc by filing for record in the oOiee of the County Recorder ol'cueh county 
in which said piopeity or .some pmt theieof is situated, a substitution of uubtcc. From the tune die substitution u> filca for re-ord, the new 
trustee shall succeed to all die powcis, duties, authonly and title of the trustee named hcicm or of ouy successor tnislee Each such 
rubsutuLon siiuil be executed find acknowledged, and notice thereof .shall be given and proof thereof nude, m the manner piovidcd by law, 
21. This Deed of Tnist shall apply to, mure to the benefit of, and bind all parties hcielo, their hens, legatees, devisee, 
administratis, executors, successors and assigns All obligations of Trustor hcieunder are jotnt and several The tain "Henefictary- .shall 
mean the owner and holder, including any pledgee, of'die note secured hereby. In tins Deed of Trust, whenever the context 60 requites, 
the masculine gender include* die feminine and/or neuter, and the singular number includes the plui nl 
22. Trustee accepts tlus Tiu.st when this Deed of Irusl, duly executea and acknowledged, is made a public record as piovided 
by law Truslcc is not obhgVcd to notify any paily hereto of pending sale under any other Deed of Trust or of any action or preceding 
m which Trustor, Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless biought by Trustee 
•A of Trust shall be construed according to the laws of die Stale of Utah 
24 I he \iilrf J Signed Trustor i cqucsts that a copy of ajiy notice of default and of any notice of sale hereunder be mailed to Jum 
; he/tMr-ufbre set forth 
jilted liability company 
Name^ £j. William Ncbeksr 
Us Manager 
J7irfu4u^» ^nL » a ^ c v a c^ a corporation 
Name Btau Nebekcr 
[Ls President 
0 r. ' 0 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County of 
On Uic ( -"^day of-Wua^y, 1999, A.D. personally before mo Dlnir Nebekcr, 
who being by mc duly swam did suy for himself tliaL he is (he President of Advanced 
Property International, Inc., a Nevada uoqsoralion and Ihnt Ihc widiin and foregoing 
instrument wns signed on behalf of suid coi Duration by authority ofa resolution of its Board 
of Directors and die said Blair Nebekcr acknowledged lo me ihnt corporation executed Uic 
san^. <._ « /'" 
Nolaiv Public 
ijUtdUM Jf'.CzlL Nctar/ Puohc ALISHAA.WHITE 
M 0 E A S M O 0 5OUI!» 
f.-ili Lake Cily. Utah 34111 
My Commiswn Zxonos 
Sooiarrtsof 2G 2000 
Slate of Utah 
STATS OF UTAH ) 
County of Salt Lake ) 
^
n
 ^
c
 '
 c
*
av
 of February, 1999, personally Appeared before mc, Blair Nebekcr die 
sifirtcr of Uic foregoing document who acknowledged to mc dial he executed ihc same. 
vdJU 
Notary Public 
STATEOFUTAII 
County of Salt Lake 
Notary Public""" 
ALISHAA.WHITE 
ttOEasMooSouih 
S - ' I L a k i G t y . U l a h a ^ m 
S«ntdo,b«r2S 20DO 
S(a(e of Utah 
•ss. 
) 
• " I 
J 
^
u
 ^
c
 I *^ day of Februnry, 1999, pcrsonnlly appeared before mc, Bob Furstcnau the 
signer of die foregoing documcnl who acknowledged to mc that he executed die same. 
Notary Public 
D M 
) 
Notary Public " " ] 
ALISHAA.WHITE , 
330 Essl 400 South I 
S.ifl la*<j C"y, Ulah 841 U 
MyCoTOTUjionCtciros ] 
Scnintnbor 25 7.COO 
mmmi 21?i2-°U^ISl?__ . J 
County of ) 
STATEOFUTAII 
r Silf-W*-
\& r-c-
On the J day of jarrmny, 1999, A.D. personally before mc D. William 
Nebekcr, who being by mc duly sworn did say for lumself Ihnlhc is Uic Manager of U.P.N. 
L.C., a Utah limited liabilily company and Ihnl Uic wiihin ond foregoing instrument was 
signed on bchnlf of said limited liability company by authoiity of a Articles of Organization 
and the snid U. William Nebekcr acknowledged to me UiaL limited liability company 
cutcd the same. ~ 
/ I \fl , n - _ 
' / W ^ \ Al3AA-wHITE 
J \b?WAy ^ ^ C.'fy. U, a M a4 ,,, 
I ^ ^ H L ^ Scptrtmtx,,^ 2000 ' 
^ — — « _ £La , G of Utah i 
REQUEST FOR FULL RECONVEYANCE 
(To be used only when indebtedness secured hereby has been paid in full) 
TRUSTEE 
The undersigned is the legal owner and holder of the note and all other indebtedness secured by the within Trust Deed. Said note, 
sthcr willi ail other indebtedness secured by said Tnisl Deed has been fully paid and satisfied; and you ai*c hereby requeued and diluted, 
payment to you of any sums owing to you under the terms of said Trust Deed, to cancel said note above mentioned, and ;il! other 
Jences of indebtedness secured by said Tru.sL Deed delivered to you herewith, together with die said Trust Deed, mid to rcconvey, 
hout warranty, lo the parties designated by the tenns of said Trust Deed, all of Uie estate now held by you thereunder. 
DATED , 19_ 
il reconveyance to: 
EXHIBrT'A' 
AND 
CoiTurxTidng at the Scutiieast ccn» cfLct 8, Bkxk 55, P a "A11, Sale Lake Giy Survey, in tl« cily of 
Salt Lake County ofSall Lake^  SUiaofUali, and oinning thence North 54 feet; tlxnce West 165 feei; 
licence South 54 fed; dience East 165 lectio the point of ComznencemenL 
Aiso, rannxnxing at a point 54 feet North of the Southeast comer of Lot 8, Bkxk 55, Plat "A", Sail 
Lake Cily Survey, and running theice Ncrth 28.5 fest; thence West 165 fei; lhaxc ScdJi 28.5 feel; 
licence EhsL 165 feet to the place of Commencement. 
Beginning ac the Southwest comer of COUNTRY CLU3 HEIGHTS, Plat 
!tAM, and running thence Ncrth 0c0ll East 215.79 feet; thence 
South 51°02' East 345 feet; thence North 89°45l West, 253.31 
feet to the point of beginning. 
AFFIDAVIT 
State of Utah 
'County of Utah 
Blair Nebeker being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and 
says ; 
1. I, on or about January 23 or 26, 1999 I called Dick 
Trathoway with when I had done business before. I knew chat I was 
in default on a previous obligation , the Tiptcn-CiCamillo Note. I 
wanted top borrow a ?150,000.00 and offered to secure and pay off 
the Tipton DiCamillo note as well. Had enough security on tha new 
deal 'to insure the Tipton-DiCamiilo deal would be straightened out, 
2. At that time I and my partner Bob Furstenau had the 
opportunity to buy a gas station for ?343,000.00 but needed a 
$150,000.00 in a hurry as there were others interested in it, 
3. Fur3tenau and t had purchased a 2i unit-apartment house a 
short time ago and Furstsnau had put up $193,000.00 cash down 
payment. ;t would take too long to get the needed money frcm a 
bank. "We needed the money in a hurry as ws wanted to buy this gas 
station before ^ny one else and the Seller needed ca3h right, 
4. I told him that as security for the loan he would have a 
first position on the gas station, the sellers would take a second 
as they needed cash in a hurry, and Furstenau and I would give 
Tretheway a second on the apartments. 
5. I agreed that he would not have to release the security on 
the ga3 station until all the monies due Tipton on the ncta are 
paid. I told him that upon payment of ths $150,000.00 we would 
get a complete release as to the condos ( to which he(Tretheway) 
0^127 
until the Tipt^-DiCamiUc p I i n c i p i l l, i a t , „ 8 t , and , u atcor!I5y 
faas to Paul Halliday were paid. 
«• P«rt of the consideration for the loan of $150,000.00
 w a 8 
that the Tiptcn-DiCamillo Note v C u w K« „ *„ -- ^ „ 
v « u u would be paid ofr bafore a relaaae 
-ould b.
 ? 1 V W as ,0 the g a s station< w i t ^ t the agrgsffisnt ^ ^ 
otf the Tipcon-Dicandllo not* Tretheway
 would noc l e n a ug ^ 
money, I explained this to Furstenua and hs agreed as long as the 
Tipton Camilla note would be assigned to u3 upon Tretheway beinc 
paid orr. 
7. All negoeiation.
 for fch9 loan ^ ^ conducCed h e c w $ e n 
Tretheway and myself Fu-ac»n»-r^;^ „. • > 
J
 tu-stanaa did not participate in the loan 
negotiations, but agreed to the stated t ' 
'I? Dated September 2 i 1991 
B l a i r m»h»^f t r 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me th-sJ^j^dSLy o£ September, 1559 
NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR SAID STATS JEANNINE KENNED* 
mtMt *mx, aw* * UTJVI 
• « * ^ 0 0 3 ST* '00 
yUPAAY U7 44107 
rikKW u i m n i w i wvwi * * 
Third Judicial District 
By. 
MAR _ 2 2000 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SANDRA L. TRETHEWAY, trustee of 
the Tretheway Family Trust, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT FURSTENAU, BLAIR NEBEKER, 
U.P.N.L.C, and ADVANCED 
PROPERTIES INTERNATIONAL, INC., 
a Nevada corporation, 
Defendants. 
COURT'S RULING 
CASE NO. 990908053 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on February 3, 
2 000, in connection with the plaintiff's and defendant Robert 
Furstenau's cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. At the conclusion 
of the hearing, the Court took the matter under advisement and 
informed counsel that they would be notified of the ruling by 
telephone. Upon further review of the moving and responding 
memoranda, the Court decided that a written ruling was warranted. 
Therefore, being fully advised of the facts in this matter and the 
applicable law, the Court rules as stated herein. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On February 1, 1999, the defendants signed a Promissory Note, 
promising to repay the plaintiff a $150,000 loan. The defendants 
also signed a Trust Deed, conveying two parcels of property, an 
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apartment/condominium complex and a gas station ("Trust Property"), 
as security for the Note. It is undisputed that defendant 
Furstenau repaid the full amount owing on the Note and requested 
reconveyance of the Trust Property. The plaintiff reconveyed the 
apartment complex, but refuses to reconvey the gas station until 
the defendants pay an additional $53,400, plus interest, which is 
due on an unrelated Note, which the parties call "the Camillo 
Note." The Camillo Note is referred to in the Promissory Note, 
but, according to defendant Fursteanau, is not secured by the Trust 
Deed. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
In his Motion, defendant Furstenau contends that the 
defendants are entitled to immediate reconveyance of all Trust 
Property because the debt secured by this property has been 
satisfied. In support of his argument, defendant Furstenau cites 
Utah Code Annotated §57-1-33.1(1)(a), which provides that "[w]hen 
an obligation secured by a trust deed has been satisfied, the 
trustee shall, upon written request by the beneficiary, reconvey 
the trust property." 
The plaintiff Concedes that she has retained the gas station 
property, but argues that she is entitled to do so because it is 
security for the Camillo debt, which remains unpaid. The plaintiff 
contends that Release Provision No. 3 of the Promissory Note 
00143 
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incorporates the Camillo Note, thereby making the release of all 
Trust Property subject to the repayment of the Camillo Note. 
The Court disagrees with the plaintiff's position that the 
scope of the Trust Deed is expanded to secure the Camillo Note as 
well. To the contrary, construing the unambiguous language of the 
Promissory Note together with the Trust Deed, leads to the 
conclusion that the three release paragraphs in the Promissory Note 
provide alternative means of partial payment and partial release of 
the Trust Property. However, there is nothing in the language of 
these releases to indicate that the defendants had to accomplish 
each one separately in order for all of the Trust Property to be 
released. Instead, the third release, on which the plaintiff 
relies, never had to be invoked if the defendants chose the second 
release alternative of repaying the full amount of the Promissory 
Note, which the defendants subsequently did. Under this second 
release paragraph, the defendants were entitled to a release of all 
Trust Property upon the payment of the full $150,000. 
Furthermore, the plaintiff's argument that the Trust Deed, 
which specifically states the secured debt as being $150,000, 
should be read otherwise as securing $203,400 in debt, is simply an 
attempt to re-write the Trust Deed, which the plaintiff drafted in 
the first place. The Promissory Note and Trust Deed by their clear 
and unambiguous language require the plaintiff to re-pay $150,000 
o fl i L 
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in order for all of the Trust Property to be released. The 
defendants having repaid this amount, are now entitled to a release 
of all of the Trust Property, including the gas station. 
Accordingly, the Court grants defendant Furstenau's Motion and 
denies the plaintiff's cross-Motion. The Court also awards 
defendant Furstenau his attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the 
provisions of the Promissory Note and Trust Deed and the 
reciprocity provision of Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.5. The Court 
declines to award damages under Utah Code Annotated §57-1-38(3) 
because the plaintiff retained part of the Trust Property under the 
mistaken, but good faith belief, that she was entitled to do so 
because the defendants had failed to pay the amount due under the 
Camillo Note. See Hector, Inc. v. United Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 741 
P. 2d 542 (Utah 1987) (This section is not meant to penalize one who 
honestly, though mistakenly, refuses to release or declare a 
mortgage of record because he believes that there has been no full 
satisfaction). 
0 0 ! 
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Counsel for defendant Furstenau is to prepare an Order 
consistent with this Court's Ruling, specifically indicating that 
the plaintiff's Complaint against the defendants is dismissed. 
Dated this _£_day of March, 20(50). 
£E£LIE A. LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
'AT L-PS-rtr* 
00I4S 
David M. Wahlquist (#3349) 
Merrill F.Nelson(#3841) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Defendant Robert Furstenau 
60 East South Temple. Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
~OT\C^\L-
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
SANDRA L. TRETHEWAY, trustee of the 
Tretheway Family Trust, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT FURSTENAU, BLAIR 
NEBEKER, U.P.N.L.C, and ADVANCED 
PROPERTIES INTERNATIONAL, INC., a 
Nevada corporation, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED FINAL JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 990908053 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on February 3. 2000, on the parties' cross-
motions for summary judgment. After hearing oral argument and reviewing the papers filed b> 
the parties, the Court issued its Ruling on March 2, 2000. Pursuant to that Ruling, the Court 
hereby orders as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs Motion For Summary Judgment is denied. 
2. Defendant Robert Furstenau's Motion For Summary Judgment is granted in part 
and denied in part as follows: 
I 
a. plaintiffs complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice; 
b. the Court hereby declares and orders that for the reasons set forth in the 
Court's Foiling referenced above, that certain Deed of Trust With Assignment of Rents recorded 
on February 1, 1999 as Entry No. 7241865 in Book 8245, Page 4727 of the Official Records of 
the Salt Lake County Recorder is void, deemed reconveyed and of no funher force or effect as a 
lien or other encumbrance on the real property located in Salt Lake County described as follows: 
BEGINNING at the Southwest comer of COUNTRY CLUB 
HEIGHTS - PLAT A, according to the official plat thereof, filed in 
Book "J" of Plats at Page 82 of the Official Records of the Salt 
Lake County Recorder, and running thence North 0°01' East 
215.79 feet; thence South 51°02' East 345.00 feet; thence North 
89°45' West 268.31 feet to the point of BEGINNING 
and further orders plaintiff to execute and deliver to defendant within ten (10) days from the date 
of this Final Judgment a request for full reconveyance of said Deed of Trust and Assignment of 
Rents in form and content sufficient to authorize the trustee therein to execute and record a deed 
of full reconveyance of said Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents; 
c. the Court hereby awards Robert Furstenau costs and attorneys fees incurred in 
this matter in the amount of $11,220.00 which shall be paid by plaintiff to Robert Furstenau 
within ten (10) days from the date hereof; and 
d. the Court denies Robert Furstenau's motion to the extent it seeks damages 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-38(3) for the reasons set forth in the Court's Ruling. 
2 
3. This Final Judgment resolves all outstanding issues in this case. 
Dated this day of April, 2000, 
BY THE COURT 
Honorable Leslie A. Lewis 
District Judge 
•J ' ' - i J 
3y, 
ID BiSTHlCT COURT 
j hird Judicial District 
MAY 2 h 2000 
SALX LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
SANDRA L. TRETHEWAY, trustee of 
the Tretheway Family Trust, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT FURSTENAU, BLAIR NEBEKER, 
U.P.N.L.C., and ADVANCED 
PROPERTIES INTERNATIONAL, INC., 
a Nevada corporation, 
Defendants. 
COURT'S RULING 
CASE NO. 990908053 
A Notice to Submit has been filed, pursuant to Rule 4-501, 
Code of Judicial Administration, in connection with the plaintiff's 
Objection to Affidavit for Attorney Fees and Filing of Final 
Judgment. Having reviewed the moving and responding memoranda, the 
Court rules as stated herein. 
The plaintiff's Objection is first directed towards the 
Affidavit of Attorney's Fees filed by Mr- David M. Wahlquist, 
attorney for defendant Furstenau. The plaintiff contends that the 
Affidavit does not adequately describe the nature of services 
performed by Mr. Wahlquist. In response to the plaintifffs 
concerns, Mr. Wahlquist has filed a Revised Affidavit of David M. 
Wahlquist. The Court determines that the Revised Affidavit 
describes the services performed with sufficient specificity. The 
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Court therefore overrules the plaintiff's Objection with respect to 
the itemization of services. In addition, having reviewed the 
Revised Affidavit, the Court determines that the attorney's fees 
requested are reasonable and necessary, given the complexity of the 
issues involved and the need for counsel to review not only the 
parties' present dealings (and the documents involved), but also to 
consider and delve into the parties' prior dealings. Accordingly, 
the Court overrules the plaintiff's Objection. The attorney's fees 
sought are granted. 
Next, the plaintiff Objects to the fact that the Final 
Judgment is inconsistent, in declaring the Trust Deed void and 
still ordering the plaintiff to reconvey it within ten days. The 
Court agrees with defendant Furstenau that while reconveyance may 
technically be unnecessary, given the Court's ruling that the Trust 
Deed has no force or effect, it would nevertheless provide a 
definitive passage of the title free and clear of the Trust Deed. 
Accordingly, the plaintiff's Objection on this basis is overruled. 
Finally, the plaintiff objects to the Final Judgment because 
of an inconsistency hJetween the amount of fees and costs specified 
in the Final Judgment and the amount set forth in Mr. Wahlquist's 
Affidavit. Defendant Furstenau recognizes this error and has 
furnished the Court with an Amended Final Judgment which accurately 
reflects the fees sought under the Revised Affidavit. The Court 
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sets aside the Final Judgment entered on March 22, 2000, and enters 
the Amended Final Judgment, which the Court executed on a date 
contemporaneous with this Court's Ruling. 
This Ruling will stand as the Order of the Court, overruling 
the plaintiff's Objection in the entirety. 
Dated this "T^ 'day of May, 2a00. 
JESLIE A. LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
0*^ 17 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Court's Ruling, to the following, this 27 day of May, 
2000: 
D. David Lambert 
Leslie W. Slaugh 
Kenneth Parkinson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
12 0 East 300 North 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 
David M. Wahlquist 
Merrill F. Nelson 
Attorneys for Defendant Furstenau 
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
yf 7//'/j/6 £naA£ 
Ort°lt 
By-
FILEDDiafRJCT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
OCT 0 4 2000 
SALT LAKE COUNTy 
^/Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SANDRA L. TRETHEWAY, trustee of 
the Tretheway Family Trust, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
ROBERT FURSTENAU, BLAIR NEBEKER, 
U.P.N.L.C, and ADVANCED 
PROPERTIES INTERNATIONAL, INC., 
a Nevada corporation, 
Defendants. 
COURT'S RULING 
CASE NO. 990908053 
Before the Court is the plaintiff's Motion for New Trial, 
Motion to Amend Ruling or in the Alternative to Amend Complaint, 
The parties appeared in Court, and counsel argued on August 31, 
2000, At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the matter 
under advisement to further consider the arguments, the relevant 
case law and statutes and the written submissions of the parties. 
Since taking the Motions under advisement, the Court has had an 
opportunity to consider or reconsider the law, all relevant 
pleadings, facts and the oral argument in this case. Now being 
fully advised, the Court enters the following Memorandum Decision. 
In its Motion, the plaintiff contends that the Court should 
reconsider its Ruling of March 2, 2000, wherein the Court granted 
defendant Robert Furstenau's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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According to the plaintiff, summary judgment is inappropriate 
because there are two issues of material fact which the Court 
alluded to in its Ruling which would preclude summary judgment from 
being granted. Specifically, the plaintiff contends that the 
Court's reference to the plaintiff's having drafted the Trust Deed 
and its statement that "according to defendant Furstenau," the 
Camillo Note was not secured by the Trust Deed constitute two 
disputed matters of fact which the Court should not have resolved 
as a matter of law. 
With respect to the first point, the Court agrees with 
defendant Furstenau that the reference to authorship was merely in 
passing and was not material to the Court's ruling, which was based 
on the plain, unambiguous language of the Note and Trust Deed. 
Moreover, the Court was not improperly resolving a dispute when it 
restated defendant Furstenau's legal position that the Camillo Note 
was not secured by the Trust Deed. Whether the Note was secured by 
the Trust Deed was the central question of law presented to the 
Court by the parties' cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. The 
Court's resolution of this legal issue in favor of defendant 
Furstenau did not require a factual assessment because the Court 
looked strictly to the plain language of the documents involved, 
without regard to extrinsic evidence. The Court remains convinced 
of the correctness of this decision and again determines that there 
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are no genuine issues of material fact concerning the fact that the 
Promissory Note and Trust Deed required repayment of $150,000 in 
order for all of the Trust Property to be released. Accordingly, 
the plaintifffs Motion for Reconsideration is denied. 
Next, the Court considers the plaintiff's Motion to Amend. 
Amendment is in the Court's discretion and not a matter of right, 
at this juncture. The Court determines that the plaintiff's Motion 
is untimely, having been filed only after the Court had disposed of 
all of the legal issues raised in the parties' cross-Motions for 
Summary Judgment. Moreover, the proposed amendment does not raise 
any new claims which appear to be legally viable. Specifically, 
the plaintiff's new theory of reformation is not applicable in this 
case because there does not appear to be any evidence of mutual 
mistake. Defendant Furstenau has consistently maintained that he 
understood and intended to sign a Note for $150,000, but not to be 
responsible for repaying or by signing any note agreeing to pay, 
$203,400, which represents the addition of an unrelated debt which 
is not the subject of the Note or the Trust Deed. (See Furstenau 
Affidavit). Accordingly, the Court concludes that the plaintiff's 
proposed Amended Complaint is untimely and legally insufficient and 
therefore denies the Motion to Amend, in its discretion. 
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This Memorandum Decision will stand as the Order of the Court, 
denying the plaintiff's Motions. No further Order in connection 
with these Motion will be necessary. 
Dated this f>Q day of September, 2000. 
LESLIE A. LEWIS .  ^  
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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